|
Shareholder Voting
We reject all types of differentiated voting rights. In most cases they
serve to protect the interest of a dominant owner. This does not mean,
however, that we subscribe to the simplistic theory of 'one share, one vote'
that is currently so popular in corporate governance circles, academia and
politics. Super-voting shares are blatant discrimination and an abuse of
the privilege that limited and public company status provides.
The one share, one vote rule sounds more than reasonable for the
distribution of voting rights among shareholders. After all, what is seen as the best (or maybe least bad) system of
government in the political field, should also be the most appropriate form of
shareholder representation.
But even in politics this principle is only a rough guide to the
reality. Various intended and unintended checks and balances exist
and lead to a situation where the principle is undermined for good
reason.
The founding fathers of the US constitution
were deeply suspicious of
unfettered democracy and maybe shareholders would be better served if the
voting structure in public companies is designed as carefully as the
constitution of the United States.
We are certainly not in favour of giving groups of shareholders
(often founding families or other controlling owners) different
voting rights. But more research is necessary and may well lead to
the conclusion that the limitation of voting rights is well-suited
to force all stakeholders to focus on the long-term well-being of
the enterprise.
►
MORE ON SHAREHOLDER VOTING
|